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• Systematic study of rules, norms and motivational values in sustainable remediation.  
• Identification of core norms and rules operating across three Australian sites.  
• Norms align with a range of environmental management principles, exceeding ESD.  
• Rules (sanctions) align with norms, and site conditions determine enforcement.  





Abstract: Efforts to achieve sustainability are transforming the norms, rules and values 
that affect the remediation of contaminated environments. This is altering the ways in 
which remediation impacts on the total environment. Despite this transformation, few 
studies have provided systematic insights into the diverse norms and rules that drive the 
implementation of sustainable remediation at contaminated sites, and no studies have 
investigated how values motivate compliance with these norms and rules. This study is a 
systematic analysis of the rules, norms and motivational values embedded in sustainable 
remediation processes at three sites across Australia, using in-depth interviews conducted 
with 18 participants between 2011 and 2014, through the application of Crawford and 
Ostrom's Institutional Grammar and Schwartz's value framework. These approaches 
offered methods for identifying the rules, norms, and motivational values that guided 
participants' actions within remediation processes at these sites. The findings identify a 
core set of 16 norms and 18 rules (sanctions) used by participants to implement 
sustainable remediation at the sites. These norms and rules: define the position of 
participants within the process, provide means for incorporating sustainability into 
established remediation practices, and define the scope of outcomes that constitute 
sustainable remediation. The findings revealed that motivational values focused on public 
interest and self-interest influenced participants' compliance with norms and rules. The 
findings also found strong interdependence between the norms and rules (sanctions) 
within the remediation processes and the normative principles operating within the 
broader domain of environmental management and planning. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of: the system of norms operating within sustainable remediation (which far 
exceed those associated with ESD); their link, through rules (sanctions) to contemporary 
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styles of regulatory enforcement; and the underlying balance of public-interest values and 
self-interest values that drives participants' involvement in sustainable remediation.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Soil and groundwater contamination is a common concern in many countries. A wealth of 
studies describes methods and technologies used for remediating contaminated 
environments (Bayer et al., 2005). This literature has traditionally been dominated by 
studies based on a narrow range of remediation benefits. They often involve cost benefit 
analysis, and the best-value remedial design is defined as the one which involves the 
lowest cost for an effective remedy over the lifetime of the remedy, whilst maximizing 
other key factors such as land value (Elmore and Graff, 1999). Over time, the scope of 
remediation practice has extended to include the “lost” costs and benefits of remediation, 
or what welfare economists call the “positive and negative externalities” (Ellis and 
Hadley, 2009) associated with contaminants (Tonin et al., 2011). Consideration of 
externalities has led to more comprehensive appraisals of the impacts of remediation 
decisions upon the total environment (Paleologos, 2008). These appraisals have involved 
engagement with a multitude of participants ranging from representatives of major 
multinational corporations through to local neighbours, and they have been influenced by 
an increased focus on sustainability across diverse international jurisdictions. This has 
acted as a driver in remediation processes (Bardos et al., 2011; Pollard et al., 2004). 
Crucially, these participants engage with each other within sustainable remediation 
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processes using extensive, multifaceted and interactive value sets, beliefs, norms and 
rules that motivate, forbid, permit and require specific actions under certain situations. 
The outcomes of these remediation processes can have far-reaching effects on different 
aspects of the total environment (e.g. species abundance, soil quality and productivity, 
ground and surface water quality, air quality, land-use potential, economic output, human 
health and safety) (Geckeler et al., 2010; Simon, 2010, 2011). Given the increasing 
diversity of participants that inform remediation processes, Pollard et al. (2004) argue 
that considering participant values and how those values are incorporated into 
remediation processes is a key challenge for scholarly and professional communities 
dealing with remediation. Similarly, others have highlighted the need for a greater 
understanding of how the norms and rules that guide our environmental decision-making 
“fit the values of those involved” (Ostrom, 2011 p.16).  
 
A broad cross section of professional organizations have sought to state what some of 
these norms, rules and values might be through the development of sustainable 
remediation guidance (SuRF Australia et al., 2011a; SuRF-UK, 2010). However, the 
ability to map the inventory of norms, rules and values that are used by participants in 
sustainable remediation practice, and in any remediation practice, has been restricted by 
the absence of systematic methodologies for carrying out such mappings. Having an 
understanding of the inventory of norms, rules and values being used by participants 
within a remediation process can be extremely valuable for regulators and professional 
organizations in helping them to understand how to create effective guidance, policies 
and legislation to support sustainable remediation (McGinnis, 2011). If these developed 
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guidelines and frameworks are not effectively linked to actual practice, they become 
irrelevant to those directly responsible for implementing remediation initiatives. 
Moreover, they can mislead those who are seeking to understand what is appropriate, and 
they may contribute to the development of regulations and legislation that are difficult to 
comply with.  
Addressing this challenge entails developing a systematic way of deconstructing the 
components (e.g. aims, performers, prescriptives, sanctions and conditions) of the norms 
and rules being used every day by participants in sustainable remediation practice. This 
enables the emerging guidance, policy and legislation to be informed by a clear 
understanding of what is considered appropriate practice. In this study we utilized the 
Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT) as a means to systematically understand the norms and 
rules that guide the implementation of sustainable remediation (McGinnis, 2011). The 
grammar for the IGT was initially formulated by Crawford and Ostrom (Crawford, 2004; 
Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) and has since been revised and developed (Basurto et al., 
2010; McGinnis, 2011; Schluter and Theesfeld, 2010; Siddiki et al., 2011). The IGT has 
been developed over the past decade to provide a methodological approach which can 
analyse the micro-level components of norms and rules. Such an approach is needed to 
support analyses of macro-level challenges such as those highlighted in this study. Whilst 
the IGT has been applied in an increasingly broad range of contexts, it has not previously 
been applied to remediation (Feiock et al., 2014; Roditis et al., 2014).  
 
Another part of the challenge involves developing a systematic way of understanding the 
values that motivate participants to comply with the norms and rules being used in day-
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to-day activities within sustainable remediation practice (Schwartz, 2012; Stern et al., 
1999). To systematically understand the values that motivate participants' compliance 
with the norms and rules of sustainable remediation, the study utilized Schwartz's theory 
of universal values, which focuses on the motivational concerns embodied in values 
(Schwartz, 1973, 1999, 2011, 2012; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). Increasingly, studies 
based on the Schwartz value system have sought to highlight the important connections 
between values and norms in the context of environmental management and 
sustainability (de Groot and Steg, 2008; Ibtissem, 2010; Nordlund and Garvill, 2002; 
Steg et al., 2014; Stern et al., 1999; Thøgersen, 1999; Thøgersen and Ölander, 2002). The 
approach that this study uses to apply Schwatz's motivational value system to 
remediation is different from the approaches used in prior research. Previous studies have 
explored how techniques such as group deliberation and value-based thinking can elicit 
and synthesize what participants ‘value’ in remediation (Abbotts and Takaro, 2005; 
Armacost et al., 1994; Geldermann et al., 2009; Grelk et al., 1998; Keeney and 
Winterfeldt, 1996).  
 
Using the IGT and the Schwartz value system as theoretical frameworks, this study 
devised a methodology to identify the norms, rules and motivational values that 
commonly guided participants' involvement in sustainable remediation processes at a 
series of Australian sites. In some contexts sustainable remediation is limited to 
“greening” remediation processes so that they maximize net environmental benefits (e.g. 
carbon mitigation) (Adamson et al., 2011; Simon, 2010). In other contexts, including 
those examined in this study, a focus on sustainability also opens remediation processes 
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to broader economic, cultural and social accountability (Bardos et al., 2000; Dixon, 2006, 
2007; Doick et al., 2009; Wernstedt et al., 2004).  
The study addresses three research questions in an attempt to gain a better understanding 
of the norms, rules and motivational values driving sustainable remediation:  
 
RQ1. What are the norms that guide participants' involvement in sustainable 
remediation?  
 
RQ2 To what extent do formal sanctions (rules) promote compliance with these norms?  
 
RQ3: To what extent do motivational value priorities drive compliance with norms and 
rules in sustainable remediation?  
 
1.1. An institutional grammar for norms and rules in sustainable remediation  
 
Using the logic of their institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework 
(Ostrom, 2005, 2011) Crawford and Ostrom have sought to unify interpretations of norms 
and rules by developing a ‘grammar’ for their contents (Crawford, 2004; Crawford and 
Ostrom, 1995). Their  institutional grammar has since been revised and developed into 
the IGT (Basurto et al., 2010; McGinnis, 2011; Schluter and Theesfeld, 2010; Siddiki et 
al., 2011). This study applies this IGT to identify the norms and rules that operate in 
sustainable remediation. Each norm or rule is a “shared linguistic constraint or 
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opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both 
individual and corporate)” (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, p. 583).  
 
Table 1 lists the components that each norm and rule in the institutional grammar is 
required to have. It also provides sample statements which describe the components of 
particular norms or rules, components that are used in this study. Both norms and rules 
contain an aim component that outlines its goals, actions or outcomes, and a prescriptive 
component which indicates what may, must, or must not be done. In both norms and 
rules, the aims are framed by three other components: performer of aim, receiver of aim 
and condition (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2005, p. 149). Whilst these shared components 
of norms and rules mean that they are conceptually related, rules are distinguished from 
norms by the presence of a tangible and formal sanction — what Crawford and Ostrom 
call the Or else component (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; McGinnis, 2011). For example, 
a sanction might be a monetary penalty, it might involve having to perform a particular 
task, or it might involve the withdrawal of a certain right (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995).  
 
The implementation of norms and rules is dependent on their context. Norms and rules 
only exist within remediation decision-making if they have some collective authority 
among participants (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Furthermore, they may not be 
exclusive to such processes and may be shared across society (e.g. effective management 
of risks to human health is a broad aim across diverse sectors of society and is not just 
limited to remediating contaminated land and groundwater, but is practised by 
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communities, markets, private associations and governments at all scales) (Ostrom, 
2005).  
 
A number of studies have shown that the institutional grammar described here can be 
used to parse written legislation, regulations and policies (Siddiki et al., 2011). This study 
sought to use the grammar to identify norms and rules through the analysis of interviews 
with respondents belonging to the participant types involved in sustainable remediation 
processes at the site level. Norms and rules can be spoken or tacitly understood; they do 
not need to be written (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). In this study the titles of the 
components of the institutional grammar have been simplified for a general audience (see 
Table 1) (Basurto et al., 2010; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Schluter and Theesfeld, 
2010).  
 
1.2. The structure of motivational values influencing compliance with the norms and 
rules in sustainable remediation  
 
The study explores values as a factor that motivates participants' compliance with norms 
and rules within sustainable remediation. Values held by people are generally described 
as rather stable broad life goals that are important to them in their lives and guide their 
perceptions, judgments and behaviours (Rohan, 2000; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). 
Schwartz and Bilsky (Schwartz, 2011, 2012; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987) developed a 
systematic theory about values by focusing on the motivational concern embodied in each 
value (e.g. ambition). These motivational values are what guide each participant to make 
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judgments about what they believe will enable them to live the best possible life (Rohan, 
2000, p. 265). Schwartz argues that people differ only in the relative priorities they place 
on the items in a universally important set of approximately 10 value types (e.g. 
achievement, stimulation, universalism, hedonism) (Schwartz, 1999, 2011) (see Fig. 1). 
Accordingly for Schwartz, these universal value types are organized in a circle based on 
their interrelationships, such that value types that are more positively correlated are closer 
to one another and are thought to be based on compatible motivations (see Fig. 1). For 
example, both power and achievement are based on the desire to achieve social 
superiority and esteem, and are therefore positively correlated and adjacent to one 
another in the value circle (see Fig. 1) (Schwartz, 1992, p. 14). Value types from opposite 
sides of the circle are negatively correlated and are based on conflicting motivations. For 
example, whilst achievement stems from the desire for social superiority and esteem, it 
conflicts with the motivation to enhance the wellbeing of others and transcend self, that 
underlies universalism (see Fig. 1). The 10 motivational value types may each contain a 
range of values (e.g., the orientation of achievement contains such individual values as 
ambitious, capable, and successful). These 10 motivational value types can be further 
grouped into four higher order domains of values organized on two bi-polar dimensions: 
self-enhancement versus self-transcendence, and openness to change versus 
conservationism (see Fig. 1) (Schwartz, 2012). Values within two of these higher order 
types were the focus of this study. These values are self-enhancement, which relates to 
the conflict between concern for the consequences of one's own and others' actions, and 
self-transcendence, which is a concern for the consequences of one's own and others' 
actions in the social context. Self- transcendence and self-enhancement are higher order 
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value types that have been found to hold significant relevance to environmental 
management and sustainability (Ibtissem, 2010; Thøgersen, 1999; Thøgersen and 
Ölander, 2002).  
 
This study examines how the motivational values of the different types of participants 
(e.g. auditors, regulatory authorities, local council officers) within the sustainable 
remediation processes influence their compliance with the norms and rules operating 
within the processes. Arguably, the motivational values which influence their decisions 
are a reflection not only of their personal values, but also of the ideological value systems 
of their professions (e.g. auditors, regulators) (Rohan, 2000, p. 265).  
 
Table 1: Sample coding of an institutional statement: Problem Holder must accept 
liability for the contaminant's containment, remediation, avoidance and abatement 
indefinitely, or else Regulatory Authority will impose responsibilities using orders, 
notices and directions.  
 
Component  Explanation of component  Norm  Rule  Coding of sample statement with relevant 
component underlined 
Aim  Describes the particular goal or 
action that the prescriptive refers to.  
    Problem Holder must accept liability for the 
contaminant remediation, avoidance and abatement 
indefinitely. 
Prescriptive a.  The prescriptive component 
stipulates whether the aim may, must, 
or must not be done. 
    Problem Holder must accept liability for the 




The individual(s), group(s) of 
individuals, or organization(s) that 
performs the aim.  
    Problem Holder must accept liability for the 




The receiver of the aim may be an 
object(s), individual(s) or group(s) of 
individuals, or organization(s) 
    Problem Holder must accept liability for the 
contaminant remediation, avoidance and abatement 
indefinitely 
Condition Qualifies the ‘when,’ ‘where,’ and 
‘how’ of the aim.  
    Problem Holder must accept liability for the 




The sanction experienced by 
performer of aim if the prescriptive 
isn’t adhered to.  
X   Problem Holder must accept liability for the 
contaminant remediation, avoidance and abatement 
indefinitely, or else Regulatory Authority will impose 
responsibilities using orders, notices and directions. 
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Table Footnotes:  
a. Called the ‘Deontic’ in the institutional grammar  
b. Called the ‘Attribute’ in the institutional grammar  
c. Called the ‘Object’ in the institutional grammar 
d. Called the ‘Or Else’ in the institutional grammar 




2. Methods  
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To address the research questions, the researcher collected data on the norms, rules and 
values used by participants within the sustainable remediation processes at three different 
Australian sites (Byrne, 2009). Whilst the analysis in this study focuses on the 
implementation of sustainable remediation at particular sites, it aims to allow 
generalizability of findings beyond these unique instances (Byrne, 2009). It does so by 
using the IGT to elicit those rules and norms that are commonly used by participants to 
implement sustainable remediation at all sites, and to examine how participants' values 
influence these rules and norms (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). This study used a two-part 
methodology: the first involved collecting and processing interview data about the norms 
and rules used by participants in implementing sustainable remediation at these sites; the 
second involved collecting and analysing survey data on the values that motivated 
participants to comply with norms and rules. The University of Technology Sydney 
Human Research Ethics Committee approved the research, and the research was 
conducted between 2011 and 2014.  
At each site members of the same six participant types were interviewed (giving a total of 
18 interviewees across all three sites). The participant types were: Problem Holder (PH), 
Local Government (LG), Auditor (A), Remedial Service Provider (RSP), Neighbours 
(N), and Regulatory Authority (RA). In this study the PH were all owners of the sites that 
were the points of origin of the environmental contamination (i.e. the source site). RA 
were representatives of state environmental protection authorities that had jurisdiction 
over the Problem Holders' sites. RSP were professionals of large engineering companies 
who specialized in remediation techniques. LG were local council planners who dealt 
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with environmental remediation in their local areas. N were adjoining property owners 
affected by contamination from the source site.  
 
To protect the confidentiality of participants, only generic information is provided on the 
processes at each site. One was located in Western Australia (WA), one in New South 
Wales (NSW), Australia, and the third in South Australia (SA). The WA site involved a 
small-scale soil and groundwater remediation project located in an industrial area of a 
city. The focus was on remediating contamination that had emanated from a single point. 
This had resulted in a plume of contaminants in groundwater under adjacent industrial 
properties, which extended towards waterways. The NSW site was in an industrial area 
surrounded by residential neighbourhoods and had various contaminants. Contamination 
associated with this site included a groundwater plume which extended under nearby 
residences and various areas of contaminated soil. The SA site was a single urban site 
surrounded on all sides by residential neighbourhoods. Contamination associated with 
this site included various areas of contaminated soil.  
 
2.1. Norms and rules data collection  
 
Whilst archival documentation of policies, legislation and other materials relating to 
remediation processes at the sites was collected at the outset of this project, the primary 
focus of the analysis was on semi- structured in-depth interviews with representatives of 
the participant types engaged in the remediation processes at the three sites. These 
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interviews were used to capture data on norms and rules that participants used to 
implement sustainable remediation at these sites.  
At the time of our study the IGT had not previously been applied to interview data to 
identify norms and rules, but only to policy and legislation (Basurto et al., 2010). Each 
interview commenced with the interviewer explaining that the research project aimed to 
understand the norms and rules in use at the site, and outlining the key components of the 
institutional grammar. Questions asked during interviews were directly related to the 
interviewee's role as a participant type (e.g. Auditor) and to their understanding of the 
roles of other participant types. Interviews were structured around the IGT components 
(see Table 1) in order to obtain data on the norms and rules that each participant type 
thought were relevant to the sustainable remediation process at their site. The 
interviewees were asked to address the following principal questions across the life of the 
sustainable remediation processes:  
• As a [interviewee's participant type] what are the particular outcomes, goals and 
actions that you must, may or must not perform during the sustainable 
remediation process at [site name]?  
• What are the particular outcomes, goals and actions that [other participant types] 
must, may or must not perform during the sustainable remediation process at [site 
name]?  
• What sanctions can [interviewee's participant type] utilize during the sustainable 
remediation process at [site name] to ensure [other participant types] perform 
their role?  
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• Who is responsible for sanctioning [interviewee's participant type] if they do not 
perform their role during the sustainable remediation process?  
 
When necessary, these questions were followed by a series of questions designed to elicit 
the when, where and how of each answer. Finally, interviewees were asked to provide 
references to documentation that detailed their or other participant types' roles and 
responsibilities within the sustainable remediation processes (e.g. legislation, policies or 
guidelines). The interview instrument was trialed and feedback was used to clarify the 
instrument. Interviews took between two and four hours each, and were conducted by 
two interviewers. The interview questions sought to collect as complete and salient a set 
of norms and rules as possible by asking each interviewee to comment, not only on their 
own roles and responsibilities, but also on those of the other participant types at each site, 
and by collecting background supporting documentation.  
 
2.2. Norms and rules data coding and nested analysis  
 
To address Research Questions 1 and 2 (Section 1) the interview data was transcribed and 
coded using IGT components detailed in Table 1 using NVIVOTM qualitative analysis 
software (QSR International). Coding of norms and rules involved six steps:  
• To maintain confidentiality, coding commenced by replacing the names of the 
participants with the six participant types listed in Section 2 above.  
• Aims that were performed by the six participant types were then coded. In many 
cases more than one participant type performed the same aim.  
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• The coding of aims was restricted by omitting all aims that were not prefaced by a 
prescriptive: must, must not, or may, either explicit or implicit (e.g. the verb 
“required” or “shall” suggests a “must”) (Basurto et al., 2010).  
• Next,formalsanctionswerecodedforeachaimremainingfromstep3.  
• Identified norms and rules were then separated out from the interview transcripts 
for further analysis. Norms or rules were reduced to their most fundamental forms 
(e.g. all synonyms for prescriptives were reduced to must, must not, or may). In 
addition, all norms and rules that were not common to the processes at all three 
sites were removed, and so were duplicate norms and rules.  
• Thefinalstepinvolvednestingthenormsandrules(formalsanctions) that emerged 
from the coding (see Fig. 2). Using the IAD framework, norms and rules were 
nested into specific categories (see Table 3): position, aggregation and scope 
(McGinnis, 2011). Position norms/rules specify a set of positions for participants 
within the remediation processes (Ostrom, 2005). Each position has a unique 
combination of resources, opportunities, preferences and responsibilities within 
the remediation processes (Feiock et al., 2014). For participant types within the 
remediation processes, aggregation norms/rules clarify “‘who is to decide which 
action or set of activities is to be undertaken” in order to achieve intermediate or 
final outcomes (McGinnis, 2011, p. 174; Ostrom, 2005, p. 202). Ostrom 
acknowledges the great diversity of aggregation rules/norms (e.g. joint control 
over an action by different participant types, or designation of control to 
participant types). Scope norms/rules specify a set of outcomes for the 
remediation processes (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2005). Whilst decisions about 
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categorization were based on these three types of rules/norms, this does not mean 
that other rule types specified in the IAD framework were not present (e.g. 
boundary rules, information rules, payoff rules).  
 
Two researchers coded the data. In order to maximize intra-coder reliability, the second 
researcher verified the coding of the first. An industry expert was engaged to adjudicate 
coding differences; in some cases the original interviewee was contacted to determine the 
accuracy of the researchers' interpretations. A high degree of agreement between the 
researchers was evident during the coding.  
 
2.3. Motivational values data collection and analysis  
 
To address Research Question 3 motivational values were measured using a short version 
of Schwartz's value scale (Schwartz, 1992), developed by Thørgersen and Olander, which 
included only 16 values (see Table 4) (Thøgersen and Ölander, 2002). The reduced 
instrument is defensible on substantive grounds: the short version of Schwartz's value 
framework has been extensively tested and validated in studies (de Groot and Steg, 2008; 
Steg et al., 2014; Thøgersen and Ölander, 2002); and the type of motivational values that 
are related to sustainability and environmentally related behaviour has a strong link to the 
values in the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension of Schwartz's 
framework (Dietz et al., 2005; Thøgersen and Ölander, 2002). Data collection targeted 
the motivational values that informed participants' professional decisions in the context of 
the remediation processes, rather than their private or personal views. All 18 of the 
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respondents from the first part of the study were asked to rate the importance of each of 
the 16 values “as guiding principles in your role as [participant type] in the decisions you 
made within the remediation process at [the site]” on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 = 
not important to 10 = extremely important. They were urged to vary the scores and to rate 
only a few values as extremely important (de Groot and Steg, 2008). Given the small 
sample size, and the fact that respondents differ in the way they use response scales, we 
only sought to identify the values that were the most important as guiding principles for 
each participant type (Schwartz, 1999, 2011, 2012) (see Table 4). They were also asked 
to explain how the values they identified as most important influenced their compliance 
with norms and rules that operated within the remediation processes at each site. 
NVIVOTM qualitative analysis software (QSR International) was used to code the 
interview data.  
 
Fig. 2. Structure of nested analysis of Norms and Rules (Norm + Formal Sanction) 








3. Results  
 
3.1. Norms guiding sustainable remediation  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the basic frequency count of the total number of norms from 
our nested analysis. Frequency counts such as those displayed in Table 2 are useful for 
identifying overall trends and tendencies. In our analysis, the frequency count revealed 
that all norms identified across the three sites, except one, were obligations (i.e. the 
prescriptive was ‘must’) and in most cases the Problem Holder was held to be responsible 
for performing them with support from the Remediation Service Provider. The aims, 
receiver of aims and conditions specified within the norms were diverse, so they could 
not be subjected to frequency analysis.  
Table 3 details the 16 norms that emerged from the analysis. These norms are divided 
into three types: position norms, aggregation norms and scoping norms. The first six 
norms (Norms 1 to 6) in Table 3 stipulate the position of each participant type within the 
sustainable remediation process. Whilst the Problem Holder, remediation Regulatory 









Table 2: Frequency counts of norms and formal sanctions and who performs them.  
	 Frequency	of	units
	 Position		 Aggregation		 Scope		 Total	
Norms	identified	within	all	three	
Remediation	processes:	
	 	 	 	
Norms:	Total	 6 7 3	 16
Norms:	Must.	 5	 7	 3	 15	
Norms:	May	 1 ‐ ‐	 1	
Norms:	Must	not	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	
Performers	of	Norms:	 	 	 	 	
Problem	Holder	 4 7 3	 14
Remediation	Service	Provider		 ‐	 7	 3	 10	
Regulatory	Authority		 1	 ‐	 ‐	 1	
Local	Government	 1 ‐ ‐	 1	
Auditor	 1	 ‐	 ‐	 1	
Neighbour	 ‐ ‐ ‐	 ‐	
Sanctions	associated	with	norms	observed	in	all	three	remediation	processes:	
Sanction:	Formal	 6	 8	 4	 18	
Performers	of	formal	sanctions:	 	 	
Problem	Holder	 1	 2	 ‐	 3	
Remediation	Service	Provider		 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	
Regulatory	Authority		 4 6 4	 13
Local	Government	 3	 6	 4	 12	
Auditor	 ‐ 4 ‐	 4	
Neighbour		 1	 ‐	 ‐	 1	
 
remediation process by fulfilling the particular responsibilities prescribed to them through 
Norms 1 through 6, it was only possible to determine the positions of the Neighbour and 
Remediation Service Provider by analysing their responses to the Problem Holder's 
fulfilment of Norms 2, 4, and 5. For example, in Norm 4 the Problem Holder [must] 
[legitimately engage with] [affected neighbours/surrounding population], and it is only 
through this action that the Neighbours are able to [... understand and participate in 
decision making that may affect them as a result of site assessment, remediation and 
management planning that may affect them].  
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Furthermore, the Problem Holder, with the support of the Remediation Service Provider, 
is the sole performer of the aggregation norms (see Norms 7–13, Table 3) which specify 
the means by which actions will achieve intermediate and final outcomes, and also the 
scoping norms (see Norms 14–16, Table 3) which specify a set of outcomes for the 
sustainable remediation process. The high number of aggregation norms (see Norms 7–
13, Table 3) highlights the significant effort that is currently expended by participant 
types on developing a pathway for obtaining sustainable remediation outcomes that 
acknowledge, integrate and build on well-established environmental planning and 
remediation principles (e.g. the precautionary principle, risk-based fit-for-purpose, ESD, 
waste minimization). The scoping norms (see Norms 14–16, Table 3) highlight that 
sustainable remediation as practised at the study sites is not just limited to the selection of 
“greening” remedies that maximize net environmental benefits (e.g. carbon mitigation). 
Rather, sustainable remediation includes processes which involve a much broader 
consideration of environmental, economic, cultural (e.g. indigenous customs) and social 
(e.g. intergenerational and intragenerational equity) accountability.  
Table 3 also highlights where norms guiding sustainable remediation were identified as 
comprising elements traced from, and interdependent with, a broader emerging context of 
normative practices (principles) associated with sustainability and environmental 
management For example the Problem Holder's responsibilities in Norm 1 are aligned 
with the polluter pays principle.  
 
3.2. Rules promoting compliance with norms  
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The frequency counts detailed in Table 2 highlight a total of 18 formal sanctions that in 
most cases the Regulatory Authorities were responsible for enforcing, supported by Local 
Government and other areas of government. These 18 formal sanctions were associated 
with 15 of the 16 norms detailed in Table 3. Within the institutional grammar a norm is 
transformed into a rule through the development of a formal sanction. Therefore, the 
study identified 18 rules operating in association with 15 of the norms in the studied 
sustainable remediation processes, with some of these norms having two associated rules 
(e.g. see Norm 8, Table 3). The nested analysis reveals a close alignment between the 
norms that emerge in the sustainable remediation processes and the rules that emerge in 
the same processes.  
As one interviewee noted, this close relationship between norms and rules creates a 
certain economy of compliance within sustainable remediation processes because 
participant types are likely to act in accordance with norms that have been well socialized 
within the remediation industry. In many cases they will also have been institutionalized 
as rules through the formation of a social sanction, but the sanction is rendered 
unnecessary by the socialization. This economy of compliance was further emphasized 
by the fact that all interviewees responsible for enforcing formal sanctions indicated that 
they preferred to deal with non-compliance issues on a case-by-case basis rather than by 
imposing blanket formal sanctions. Generally, they said they sought to be lenient when 
implementing sanctions, and said this largely reflected the desire to maintain harmonious 
and cooperative relations between regulating agencies and members of the industry. Of 
the six regulatory authorities and local government representatives interviewed, only one 
stated that they interpreted sanctions very literally and five stated that they interpreted the 
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different sanctions with some degree of leniency. One of the latter interviewees noted that 
she only used sanctions when a Problem Holder or a member of another participant type 
was not actively seeking to comply with their obligations. She then stated that, 
oftentimes, non-compliance with norms had minor or negligible implications, and that it 
was not appropriate to enact sanctions in these cases. She further stated that conditions 
largely shaped her interpretation of the need to enact sanctions. For example, a ‘must’ 
was really only a must in a norm under certain conditions (e.g. extreme risk to human 
health).  
 
The participant types identified one sanction (i.e. Formal Sanction 5) that was 
implemented by Neighbours and broader communities against the Problem Holder if the 
Problem Holder didn't obtain a social licence to operate (SLO) a specific remediation 
technology from the affected community. The researchers decided to call this Neighbour 
and broader communities-based sanction a formal sanction because it involved tangible 
acts such as limiting access to neighbouring land and punishing the Problem Holder 
through ‘spotlighting’ their actions. These sanctions are not unlike those that are often 
imposed by environmental courts. Environmental courts have demonstrated some 
willingness to use sanctions such as ‘spotlighting’ instead of more traditional penalties 
such as monetary penalties and sentencing. Similarly, the Australian Institute of 
Criminology notes that orders that might be particularly effective are those that put a 
spotlight on the fact that a wrongdoing has been committed (Bricknell, 2010). The fact 
that an environmental wrongdoing has been committed can be highlighted by publicizing 
the offence in a medium available to the public and/or the offender's peer group. This 
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targets the prestige, profit and stability of larger corporations and may have a greater 






Table 3 Norms and Rules (norm + formal sanction) guiding Sustainable Remediation  
 
PART 1: Norms and rules stipulating the position of each participant type within the sustainable remediation process  
Norm 1: [Problem Holder] [must] [accept liability and responsibility for] [the containment remediation, avoidance or abatement] [indefinitely].  
This norm is related to the polluter pays principle: those who generate pollution or waste should bear the costs of containment cleanup, avoidance or abatement.  
All (n) 
Formal sanction 1: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority and/or other areas of government] [will apply a legislated hierarchy to identify the Problem Holder and 
impose responsibilities using orders, notices and directions] a.  
The hierarchy generally commences with the polluter. If it is not practicable to assign responsibility to the polluter, responsibility is allocated to others, including 
the owner who as acquired the title, followed usually by the relevant public authority. 
 
Norm 2: [Problem Holder] [may] [contract] [remediation service providers to undertake the remediation processes for the contaminated site and engage with 
participants] [as needed].  
 
Formal Sanction 2: [Or else] [the Problem Holder] [may sue Remediation Service Provider for breach of agreed contract and possible associated penalties].  
Norm 3: [Regulatory authorities and local government] [must] [take responsibility for regulating] [the remediation processes for contaminated sites in their 
jurisdictions] [through reviews, licensing, notices, orders and approvals in accordance with jurisdictional legislation].  
This norm is related to the principle of share responsibility: protection of the environment and society is a responsibility shared by all levels of government and 
All (n) 
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industry, business, and communities. 
Formal Sanction 3: [Or else] [Government Regulator and/or other areas of government] [may issue penalties (e.g. monetary) or impose responsibilities using 
orders, notices and directions] b. 
 
Norm 4: [Problem Holder] [must] [legitimately engage with] [affected neighbours/surrounding population] [so they can understand and participate in decisions about  
any site assessment, remediation and management planning that may affect them].  
This norm is related to the principle of accountability: the local community has a legitimate right to understand and be engaged in decisions that may affect them 
about the restoration, protection and enhancement of the environment.  
All (n) 
Formal Sanction 4: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority and/or other areas of government] [may issue orders or directions to carry out local community engagement 
processes and demonstrate how the communities’ input has been taken into consideration] c. 
 
Norm 5: [Problem Holder] [must] [gain approval from] [affected local community, particularly affected Neighbours, for the remediation and management plan to be 
implemented, particularly in relation to the remediation technologies that are to be utilized.] [The approval may be unwritten.]  
This norm is related to the idea of ‘Social License to Operate: the local community has a legitimate right to accept or reject a proposed remediation and management 





Formal Sanction 5: [Or Else] [Neighbours and the broader affected community] [may impose a range of sanctions on the Problem Holder’s plans, ranging from 
Neighbours restricting the Problem Holder’s access to their property through to collective public/political campaigns to oppose the plans implementation]. 
 
Norm 6: [Auditors] [must] [independently review and provide guidance on] [assessment and remediation work conducted by site consultants in undertaking 
contaminated site investigations and remediation] [to ensure that the work complies with the requirements of legislation (unless supported by clear reasoning), and 
that the remediation meets the standard applicable to the proposed land use.] 
All (n) 
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Formal Sanction 6: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority and/or other areas of government] [may revoke the accreditation and /or impose penalties.]d  
 
PART 2: Aggregation norms and rules 7 through 13 clarify who is to decide which action or set of activities is to be undertaken that leads to 
sustainability outcomes 
 
Norm 7: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [seek the trust and confidence] [of other participants, including the local community] 
[throughout the remediation and management of the contaminant(s)]  
All (n) 
Norm 8: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [effectively assess] [the remediation and management planning for contaminated sites] 
[using clear and transparent ecologically sustainable development (ESD) principles and tools with other participants].  
This norm utilises the principle of ESD: integrated assessment of environmental, economic and social impacts of development must meet the needs of the present 
generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.  
All (n) 
Formal Sanction 8a: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, Auditor, Local Government and/ or other areas of government in NSW and SA] [may issue notices, 
orders or directives to the Problem Holder to ensure that contaminated sites are managed so as to maintain ESD] e. 
 
Formal Sanction 8b: [Or else] [the Problem Holder] [may take formal action against the Remediation Service Provider for breach of agreed contract and 
seek associated penalties].  
 
Norm 9: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [use] [the precautionary principle] [to address the current site contamination and prevent 
further contamination at the site].  
This norm utilizes the precautionary principle: where there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental degradation from a particular action, lack of 
scientific certainty about the environmental impacts of that action should not be used as a reason to postpone measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
PH, RSP, 
A, LC, RA 
(n) 
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Formal Sanction 9a: [Or else] [the Regulatory Authority, Auditor, local government and/or other areas of government] may issue orders, notices or 
directions to ensure the precautionary principle or precautionary approach is adopted by the Problem Holder] f. 
 
Formal Sanction 9b: [Or else] [the Problem Holder] [may sue the Remediation Service Provider for breach of contract and possible associated penalties].  
Norm 10: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [clearly demonstrate] [the remediation and management option selected for the 
contaminated site] [has an equivalent or higher level of performance than other options]. 
PH, 
RSP,A (n) 
Formal Sanction 10: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, Auditor and/or local government and / or other areas as of government][will impose an options 
hierarchy to guide selection of the remediation and management option for the contaminated site] g. 
 
Norm 11: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [ensure] [sustainable remediation approaches] [are compatible with risk-based fit-for-
purpose approaches when carrying out site assessment, and developing the remediation and management plan for the contaminated site].  
This norm utilizes the risk-based fit-for-purpose philosophy which: determines landuse scenarios for which risk-based health investigation levels and ecological 
investigation levels have been derived. The intended use of the site determines the level of contamination risk that may be permitted to remain on the site. 
All (n) 
Formal Sanction 11: [Or else] [Regulatory Authorities, Auditor, local government and/or other areas of government] must issue instructions, orders and 
notices requiring the Problem Holder to carry out site assessment and develop remediation and management plans that include a coordinated set of activities 
and methods to control risks so as to promote the likelihood that the site can be made suitable for the proposed use and provide adequate protection of human 
health, property and the environment] h. 
 
Norm 12: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [integrate] [contaminated site remediation and management decision-making] [with local, 
regional and state planning and development processes]  





remediation strategy that is sustainable.  RA (n) 
Formal Sanction 12: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, local government and/or other areas of government] [will impose orders and directions such as 
management plans, cleanup notices, ongoing maintenance orders and enforcement, financial assurances, abatement notices, contaminated site registers, 
memorials or notations on land titles, and aligned planning and development permit approval processes. Should the land use of the site change, the process is 
re-instituted and the assessment, management and remediation procedures are carried out in accordance with the new intended land use. All jurisdictions have 
post-remediation/management controls.] 
 
Norm 13: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [pursue site-specific remediation technologies and approaches] [using: 
 the most cost effective option, by establishing incentive structures, including market mechanisms, that enable those best placed to maximise benefits or 
minimise costs to develop their own solutions and responses to environmental problems. 
 full life cycle of costs of providing services, including the use of natural resources and assets and the ultimate disposal of any waste, in a way that 
minimises local, regional and global impacts. Consideration needs to be given to management of energy, water and other material resources. Taking into 
consideration the scarcity, minimization, depletion rates, regional availability, recycling and recovery of water, energy and material resources,  as well as  
hazardous and non-hazardous waste generated through remediation, residual contamination, rehabilitation needs (e.g. to restore soil and ground 
functions), and the fate of treated contaminants (destruction, versus removal, versus containment/ stabilization, permanence of the solution)]. 
This norm utilizes the principle of prevention: that steps need to be taken to minimize the creation of any additional contamination; to prevent the further 
contamination of already contaminated sites by reducing risk to human health; and to prevent the degradation of the environment by using mechanisms that 
promote cleaner production, eliminate harmful wastes, reduce the use of materials and promote the re-use, recovery or recycling of materials. 






cycling, recovery of energy, containment and only lastly disposal. 
Formal Sanction 13: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, local government and/or other part of government] [may impose restrictions, requirements, notices or 







PART 3: Norms and rules 14 through 16 scope the anticipated sustainability outcomes from the remediation processes  
Norm 14: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [ensure] [remediation and management planning for contaminated sites] [is carried out to 
safeguard intragenerational and intergenerational equity]. 
This norm utilizes the ideas of intragenerational equity (the rights of people within the current generation of fair access to natural resources e.g. access to safe land 
and groundwater) and intergenerational equity (the responsibility of current generations to ensure that their resource use does not limit the resources available to 





Formal Sanction 14a: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, local government and/or other area of government within NSW and SA] [may impose requirements 
upon the Problem Holder that ensure that the principle of intergenerational equity is incorporated into remediation decision-making processes] j.  
 
Formal Sanction 14b: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, local government and/or other area of government] [may impose requirements upon the Problem 
Holder that ensure that the principle of is incorporated into remediation decision-making processes]. 
Whilst specific references to intragenerational equity were not found in NSW, SA or WA remediation legislation, it was understood to be implicit within the 
‘polluter pays’ aspects of existing legislation, in which a person must be held responsible for the way in which they misuse current resources to the 
disadvantage of others within that generation.] 
 
Norm 15: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [protect] [essential ecological processes and life-support systems within the context of the 
principle of sustainable use] [during the remediation process by protecting: 
 human health and safety (anthroposphere) from impacts of contaminants and adverse effects resulting from remediation. 
All (n) 
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 air (atmosphere) from the impacts of contaminants, the impacts of substances added during remediation such as chemical solvents, and the impacts of 
remediation by-products and emissions (toxic substances, greenhouse gases, stratosphere ozone depleting gases such as CFCs).  
 ground and surface water (hydrosphere) by reducing the impacts of substances added during remediation (e.g. nutrients and fertilizers, chemical reagents) 
and the impacts of remediation by-products and emissions (e.g. toxic inorganic substances, substances that change pH) 
 flora and fauna (biosphere) by reducing the impacts of organisms added during the remediation (e.g. bacteria, fungi, plants) on ecosystems (naturally 
occurring organisms), and the impacts on the “quality of the nature” (conservation of biological value and biodiversity), ecosystem 
 soil function (lithopshere) by reducing the impacts of substances added during the remediation on soil systems (nutrients, fertilizers, surfactants), the 
impacts of organisms added to soil system (organisms), the impacts of process by-products and emissions on soil systems, and changes in soil function or 
the impacts on subsurface structure of remediation work.]  
This norm utilizes the principle of sustainable use: whilst a certain sovereign right exists over the exploitation of natural resources, this right is qualified by a duty 
to refrain from causing irreparable damage to the ecological system. k. 
Formal Sanction 15: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, Local Government and other areas of government in NSW, WA and SA] [may issue notices, orders or 
directives ensuring that contaminated sites are managed so as to maintain ESD and broader legislation in WA, SA, NSW.] l.  
 
Norm 16: [Problem Holder and Remediation Service Provider] [must] [minimize impacts] [on local and regional amenity] [during the remediation processes from: 
increased vehicular traffic; infrastructure changes to public rights of way for road, rail and other transport; noise, dust, litter and vibration; the visual impact of 
operations; restrictions to the physical use of space; and remediation by-products and emissions (light, heat, organisms)]. 
All 
Formal Sanction 16: [Or else] [Regulatory Authority, Local Government and/or other part of government] [may impose restrictions, requirements and 




Table Footnotes:  
a. Western Australia Contaminated Site Act (2003); New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997); South Australia Environment Protection Act 
(1993); ANZECC position paper on Financial Liability for Contaminated Site Remediation (1994). 
b. New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997); ,South Australia Development Act 1993.  
c. New South Wales Environment Protection Act (1993); Western Australia Contaminated Sites Act (2003); Western Australia Contaminated Sites Management 
Series, Community Consultation (n.d); Australian National Environmental Protection (Assessment of Site contamination) Measures, Schedule B(8) (1999).  
d. New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997); Western Australia Contaminated Sites Act (2003). 
e. New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997); New South Wales Environment Protection Act (1993); South Australia Development Act 
(1993); and the Australian National Strategy of Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992) for references to ESD. ESD is not included in the Western 
Australia Contaminated Sites Act (2003) or  Western Australia Environmental Protection Act 1993. 
f. The New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997) identifies the precautionary principle as one principle of ESD. 
g. See Western Australian Environment Protection Authority Guidance Statement for Remediation Hierarchy for Contaminated land No17. (n.d); South Australia 
Environment Protection Authority Guidelines for Site Contamination Audit System (EPA SA); New South Wales Department of Environment and Conservation 
Guidelines for the NSW Site Auditor Scheme (2006); and the Australian National Environment Protection (Assessment of Site Contamination) Measure (1999).  
h. See New South Wales Managing Land Contamination – Planning Guidelines SEPP 55 (1998); South Australian Environment Protection Act (1993); Western 
Australian Contaminated Sites Act (2003); AS/NZS ISO 31000 Risk Management (2009); Australian National Environmental Protection (Assessment of Site 
contamination) Measures (1999).  
i. New South Wales Protection of the Environment Act (1997), South Australia Environment Protection Act (1993), Mew South Wales Contaminated Land 
Management Act (1997),and the Western Australia Contaminated Sites Act (2003). Central to this approach as stated in the New South Wales Contaminated 
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Land Management Act (1997) is ‘improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms—namely, that environmental factors should be included in the valuation 
of assets and services’ 
j. See New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997), South Australia Environment Protection Act (1993). Intergenerational equity is not 
incorporated into the Western Australia Contaminated Site Act (2003). 
k. See Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration (1972). 
l. See New South Wales Contaminated Land Management Act (1997); New South Wales Protection of the Environment Operations Act (1997); South Australia 
Development Act (1993), and the Australian National Strategy of Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992); Australian National Environmental Protection 
(Assessment of Site contamination) Measures, Schedule B(9) Guideline on Protection of Health and the Environment During the Assessment of Site 
Contamination; and, specific guidelines for soil, surface and ground water protection, fauna and flora (e.g. Development Acts, National Parks and Wildlife Act, 
Native Vegetation Acts, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Acts in each Australian state) 
m. For volatile odor and gas emissions see for example: Australian National Environmental Protection (Assessment of Site contamination) Measures, Schedule 
B(9) Guideline on Protection of Health and the Environment During the Assessment of Site Contamination; Australian National Environment (Ambient Air 
Quality) Protection Measure (1998), and environmental health risk assessment guidelines in each state. 
n. Indicates the participant types that identified the associated Norm during the research: Problem Holder (PH), Local Government (LG), Auditor (A), Remedial 









3.3. Motivational value priorities driving compliance with norms and rules (sanctions)  
 
Next, interviewees' responses regarding the motivational value priorities that encouraged 
their compliance with norms and with the enforcement of sanctions (rules) were 
analysed. All eighteen interviewees who participated in the study responded to this set of 
questions.  
 
In the survey all interviewees in each participant type, except Neighbours, identified 
similar priority value orientations for their participant types that motivated them to 
comply, or not comply, with the norms associated with the sustainable remediation. 
These similarities across professional types could be explained by the fact that, as Rohen 
notes, there is often a clear parallel between personal value systems and the value 
systems of a professional group that one might join (e.g. Auditors as a professional 
group) — that is, people are attracted to professions that suit their value systems (Rohan, 
2000, p. 265). This would also explain why a group like Neighbours, which does not 
constitute a professional group, may not share priority motivational values. The three 
interviewees who identified as Neighbours each had different priority value orientations 
(achievement, self-direction, benevolence). We witnessed symmetry between those 
professional participant types (Regulatory Authority, Local Government) which 
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transcended self- interest by showing concern for the welfare and interests of others 
(universalism) and those (Problem Holder, Remediation Service Provider, Auditor) 
which promoted self-enhancement by emphasizing pursuit of self-interest and relative 
success and dominance over others (power, achievement) (see Table 4). Whilst those who 
valued power and achievement, in particular the Problem Holder and the Remediation 
Service Provider, were responsible for performing most of the norms, the Regulatory 
Authority and Local Government, who showed concern for the welfare and interests of 
others, were responsible for enacting most of the formal sanctions to enforce norms if 
needed.  
 
Table 4: Highest mean scoring motivational value types for each participant type is 
marked with an ‘X’.  
  Participant type  
Motivational 
Value Types 
How important or unimportant 
is … as a guiding principle in 
your role as [participant type] 
for the decisions you made 
within the remediation process 













Benevolence Helpfulness  4.67 5.33 6.33 6.33 7.67 5.67 
Honesty 4.33 6.00 5.33 7.67 7.33 7.33 
Responsibility 3.67 5.33 5.67 7.33 8.33 5.67 
Overall Benevolence       
Universalism 
 
Equity 5.00 6.33  X X  
Protecting the environment 5.67 6.33  X X  
Social justice 5.67 6.00  X X  
Overall Universalism X X 
Achievement Capability 7.33 X X    
Ambition 7.33 X X    
Success 8.00 X X    
Overall Achievement  X X    
Power Social Recognition  X 8.00     
Authority X 8.33     
Wealth X 8.00     
Overall Power X      
Hedonism Pleasure       
 Enjoy life       





All interviewees who identified as Problem Holders identified “power”, that is, “social 
status and prestige, and importance of control and dominance over people and resources”, 
as a priority value orientation influencing their decisions. These interviewees emphasized 
the importance of three single values – authority, wealth and social recognition – that are 
central to the value orientation of power. Seeking to maintain “wealth” by “reducing 
expenses to the problem holder in the short and longer term” was the strongest motivator 
for complying with or flouting norms. One of the Problem Holder interviewees noted that 
their company would not accept liability (Norm 1), and preferred to work voluntarily 
with the Regulatory Authority to remediate the site in order to limit the company's formal 
financial liabilities. Another interviewee argued that it was important to build a trusting 
relationship with others (Norm 7) because “trust lowered the Problem Holder's 
transaction costs by reducing the amount of time, communication and resources that they 
needed to spend reassuring other participants of information and plans for remediation 
and management processes”. Seeking to maintain “Authority” over “processes in which 
the Problem Holder was involved” was another motivator for compliance with norms, 
where compliance could “reduce the level of enforcement and monitoring that Regulatory 
Authorities and Local Governments impose on the Problem Holder”. Where the Problem 
Holders established sanctions (Formal Sanctions 2, 8b and 9b) within the remediation 
process their primary intention was to maintain their “authority over the remediation 
process” by incentivizing the actions of the Remediation Service Provider through 
contract agreements. Finally, seeking to enhance the Problem Holder's “social 
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recognition” or seeking to “preserve positive public image” were important reasons for 
their compliance with norms. Two interviewees noted that compliance with these norms 
“aligned with the corporate social responsibility policies of the Problem holder”(e.g. 
sustainability charter or strategy).  
 
All interviewees who identified as Remediation Service Providers or Auditors identified 
“achievement”, that is, “personal success through demonstrating competence according 
to social standards”, as the primary value orientation motivating their decisions to comply 
with norms that they must perform within the remediation processes. These interviewees 
emphasized the importance of two single values – being capable and being successful – 
that are central to the value orientation of achievement. “Capability,” that is 
“demonstrating competent performance within sustainable remediation that generates 
resources necessary for individuals to survive and for institutions to research their 
objectives” was the strongest motivator for their compliance with or rejection of norms. 
One interviewee noted that their compliance with norms increased their competence and 
“furthered demand for their consulting expertise within the remediation industry”. 
“Success” was also a strong motivator for compliance. As one interviewed Remediation 
Service Provider noted, a “Remediation Service Provider may develop technologies and 
approaches that can be replicated across the international remedial industry. This will 
enhance the service provider's status as a benchmark operator within the industry”. When 
an Auditor enforced sanctions, a key motivator was to demonstrate their capability to 
appraise remediation processes.  
		 40
All interviewees who nominated as Regulatory Authorities and Local Government 
identified “universalism”, that is, “to understand, appreciate and protect the welfare of all 
people and nature (within their jurisdiction)”, as the primary value orientation motivating 
their decisions to comply with norms that they must perform within the remediation 
processes. These interviewees highlighted the importance of three single values – social 
justice, equity, and protection of the environment – that are central to the value 
orientation of universalism. The values of “equity” and “social justice”, that is “concern 
for the welfare of the broader population in their jurisdictions” were the strongest 
motivators for their compliance with or rejection of norms. These values were also the 
strongest determinants of the intensity with which they implemented the sanctions that 
they were responsible for enforcing. As one interviewee noted, compliance with norms 
(see Norm 3) and implementation of sanctions helped them to “ensure procedural justice 
for all participants involved in the process, and [enabled] the [Regulatory Authority and 
Local Council] to protect the welfare of all people within the jurisdiction”. Whilst the 
values of equity and justice, which had direct anthropocentric benefits, were their 
strongest motivators for compliance, these interviewees also strongly supported 
compliance with norms and sanctions that enabled them to manage natural resources in a 
manner that was of benefit to their jurisdiction. In protecting the environment, the 
emphasis was on how the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and lithosphere could be 
maintained to support the anthroposphere.  
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The overall mapping of the relationships between the norms, rules (sanctions) and 
priority motivational values operating within the remediation processes at all three sites 





Fig. 3. Mapping of relationships between participant types, priority motivational values types, norms and rules (norm + 
sanction) operating in sustainable remediation.  
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4. Concluding discussion  
 
A key theoretical and practical challenge that has faced professionals, communities and 
public policy scholars has been the need to develop a systematic understanding of the 
institutional arrangements – the norms and rules – that guide practices such as 
remediation. This understanding is essential to the development of professional 
guidelines and public policies. In response to this challenge, the present study uses the 
recently developed IGT to identify the basic elements of the norms used by the 
participant types who engage in sustainable remediation, and to identify the rules (formal 
sanctions) that inform their compliance with those norms. Furthermore the application of 
Schwartz's value framework provided a means of illustrating how the professional values 
of each participant type motivated them to comply with those norms and rules in different 
ways.  
 
4.1. Normativity operating within sustainable remediation  
 
The IGT analysis revealed the common norms shared by participants across three 
sustainable remediation processes. What the IGT helps to illustrate are the overall 
interrelationships between who is involved in fulfilling the norms that make up 
sustainable remediation processes, who is permitted to perform what actions, who is 
forbidden to perform them, and under what conditions. That is, the IGT helps to uncover 
the microelements of the norms at the same time as it reveals a macro view of the norms 
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used in remediation, to help policy analysts and remediation professionals to understand 
who are the main participants (performers) involved, and where most of the decision-
making power is located, which in turn might determine the overall degree of 
enforceability of the set of norms being analysed. Given that the formal sanctions 
provided for by specific remediation legislation and policy in Australia tend to be used 
only sparingly, and given that the emphasis is on negotiated and voluntary remediation 
processes, it is important to understand and articulate the micro and macro structures of 
the norms that guide such negotiated and voluntary processes. As Fowler notes:  
Regulators have preferred... [a] negotiated approach because it avoids the possibility of 
legal appeals or other forms of litigation designed to contest liability to potentially 
responsible parties. The negotiated approach understandably has also been attractive to 
potentially responsible parties because it avoids the imposition of formal orders on them. 
This can be a significant consideration in terms of corporate reporting requirements 
(Fowler, 2008, n.p.).  
 
One of the most striking findings from the IGT analysis is the key role that the Problem 
Holder plays in performing the vast majority of norms, and the imperative that they must 
perform these norms, usually supported by the Remediation Service Provider. Notable by 
its absence in the majority of these norms is an expectation that affected communities, 
Auditors, Local Councils and Regulatory Authorities should contribute to the 
performance of the aims within the norms. Their responsibility, as has been discussed, is 
focused upon the implementation of sanctions to encourage compliance. Arguably, the 
focus of responsibility on the Problem Holder reflects the current acceptance and 
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dominance of the polluter pays principle within Australian remediation practice, which 
does not just imply, as the phrase might suggest, that the Problem Holder monetarily 
support the remediation, but that they must perform the remediation.  
 
The IGT analysis revealed that the norms operating in sustainable remediation comprise 
elements traced from, and interdependent with, a broader emerging context of normative 
principles associated with sustainability and environmental management; that is, 
sustainable remediation can be thought of as being a component of a complex system of 
normative principles operating within society (see Table 3). In emerging international and 
Australian sustainable remediation industry guidelines this complex system of normative 
principles that make up sustainable remediation is often overly simplified and attributed 
to the idea of ESD (Bardos et al., 2011; SuRF ANZ, 2012; SuRF Australia et al., 2011b). 
Whilst ESD “is itself not [conceived of] as a norm: [but is] no more than a name for a set 
of norms ... a meta-principle ... exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, pushing and 
pulling the boundaries of true primary norms” (Lowe, 1999, p. 19, 30), the collection of 
norms that is often considered to constitute the ESD principle are far fewer than those 
illustrated in Table 3. As illustrated in Table 3, sustainable remediation has a normative 
core that extends beyond ESD to incorporate a broad range of normative principles which 
include, among others: the polluter pays principle, the principle of shared responsibility, 
the principle of accountability, the principle of localization, the precautionary principle, 
the risk-based fit-for-purpose principle, the principle of prevention, the principle of 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, the principle of sustainable use and the 
principle of waste minimization. A characteristic of this collection of normative 
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principles that constitute the meta-principle of sustainable remediation is that they cannot 
be defined in precise terms, yet they are absolutely indispensible components of 
sustainable remediation practice at the sites that we examined. Within the remediation 
processes at these sites participant types often failed to achieve the ideals expressed 
within each principle (as several of the participants noted during the data collection), and 
they often had to trade off one outcome against another in order to achieve the overall 
goal of sustainable remediation. Sustainable remediation is much broader in scope than 
ESD, but like ESD, its significance is that it might be considered to be (to paraphrase 
Lowe's words) a meta-normative principle exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, 
pushing and pulling the boundaries of the norms that constitute it when they threaten to 
overlap or conflict with each other (Lowe, 1999, p. 30). That is, the significance of this 
overarching meta-normative principle is that it allows the participant types to consider 
and engage a range of individual norms, but to gauge their importance collectively.  
 
4.2. Formal sanctions promoting compliance  
 
Whilst the Problem Holders were obliged to perform most norms within the remediation 
processes (with the support of the Remediation Service Providers), the IGT analysis 
highlights that the prime responsibility of other participant types – Regulatory Authority, 
Local Council, Neighbour, Auditor – across the three sites was to ensure that this 
performance complied with the expectations, needs and interests of the broader public 
(e.g. see Norms 3 and 5). An interesting development in the Australian context in recent 
decades has been the development of a system of environmental auditors (see Norm 6) 
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which represents a partial privatization of the administration of state governments' 
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising remediation in line with the public's 
interest (Fowler, 2008, p. 25).  
 
The formal sanctions detailed in Table 3 were identified by participants as key means for 
ensuring that the public interest is protected, largely through deterrence. It is claimed that 
there is a lack of regulatory drivers for sustainable remediation, and that there is a need 
for a firmer mandate to carry it out. Observers who highlight these alleged problems 
claim they are limiting the implementation of sustainable remediation (see Ellis and 
Hadley, 2009; Deyi et al., 2014). However, this study identified a broad cross section of 
state and federal regulatory mechanisms which permit sustainable remediation to be 
enforced by government (see notes to Table 3). The degree to which regulatory 
authorities seek to enforce such regulations is reflective of the environmental regulatory 
hierarchy that has been in operation in the Australian context (and in many other 
international jurisdictions) for some decades. Environmental misdemeanours are dealt 
with using a sequential regulatory pyramid which commences at the base with attempts to 
promote voluntary clean-ups by wrongdoers (via mechanisms such as corporate due 
diligence). If these attempts are not successful the next steps are administrative actions 
such as notices which are designed to educate perpetrators and rectify wrongdoings. If 
these actions do not have the desired effect, the next step on the regulatory pyramid is to 
launch a prosecution that involves deterrents in the form of fines and custodial sentences 
(Abbot, 2005; Kagan and Scholz, 1984). The emphasis is on voluntary remediation by the 
industry and regulatory authorities, as discussed in Section 3.2. This reflects best practice 
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deterrence and prevention models in which formal sanctions are a last resort. Both 
Scholz's tit-for-tat enforcement strategy (Scholz, 1984) and Ayers and Braithwaite's 
enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 1985; Grabosky and Gant, 2000) are based on the 
premise that best-practice regulation must involve a mix of persuasion and punishment, 
although they differ on how intricate or complex that mix needs to be (Bricknell, 2010). 
Punishment should be “in the background until there is no choice but to move it to the 
foreground” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p. 47). However, punishment must be 
perceived as unavoidable for those who do not cooperate and adjust their behaviour 
following intervention at the lower levels of the pyramid. Best practice models require 
environmental protection agencies to play dual roles as regulators and enforcers. A key 
consequence of this regulatory pyramid is that formal sanctions need to have an inbuilt 
flexibility so that authorities are able to use their enforcement discretion based on the 
Problem Holder's performance of remediation.  
This research revealed one formal sanction that was implemented by the Neighbour and 
broader community that was explicitly recognized by most participant types. This 
sanction was associated with Problem Holders obtaining a social licence to operate (SLO) 
from Neighbours (and broader surrounding communities) for the remediation option 
selected (see Norm 5). SLO refers to the (often tacit) “contract” with members of an 
affected community, which enables a Problem Holder to enter a community and 
implement a remediation solution (Nelsen, 2006). This contract is a complement to the 
provision of formal regulatory approval for the remediation solution, and the two are by 
no means identical. In the remediation processes studied in this research, the attainment 
of an SLO was closely linked to the selection of technologies and methods, and in 
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particular, to the ability of experts engaged in the processes to incorporate external 
perspectives and social values into the design of those technologies and methods. 
Consequently, technology assessment was seen to exist not only within the ‘non- social’ 
domain of technical expertise and the fields of science and engineering, but also within 
society more broadly. Ultimately, the selection of remediation technologies was seen as 
being based on a holistic examination of how they addressed the full spectrum of aims 
which participant types associated with sustainability.  
 
4.3. Motivational values driving compliance  
 
Values are central components of our natures and personalities. They are distinct from 
our attitudes, beliefs and norms, and are critical motivators of the behaviours and 
attitudes that define, for example, how participant types comply with the norms and rules 
operating within the sustainable remediation processes discussed in this study (Schwartz, 
2012, p. 17). As Schwartz has noted:  
Our values affect whether we accept or reject particular norms. Because norms 
prescribe behaviors with specific consequences, we are more or less inclined to 
accept them depending on whether these consequences are compatible or in 
conflict with our valued goals (2012, p. 16).  
Similarly, the developers of the IGT acknowledge the important role values play in the 
formation of norms or rules (Schluter and Theesfeld, 2010; Siddiki et al., 2011), although 
they do not provide a framework or structure for eliciting those values. In this study the 
Schwartz motivational values framework was used to elicit the motivational values 
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driving the compliance of different participant types with the norms and rules operating 
in sustainable remediation. Whilst other studies have acknowledged and sought to elicit 
the values operating in sustainable remediation (Abbotts and Takaro, 2005; Armacost et 
al., 1994; Keeney and Winterfeldt, 1996; Rio Tinto Alcan, 2009), the present study is the 
first to provide insight into the association between participant values and the diverse 
rules and norms that are collectively used by participants when implementing sustainable 
remediation processes.  
 
The findings of this study indicate that the motivational values in the domain of self-
transcendence (e.g. universalism) were a key driver for those participant types who 
support public interest in sustainable remediation, predominantly through regulation and 
sanctions (i.e. Regulatory Authority, Local Government), whilst for other participant 
types the domain of self-enhancement (e.g. power, achievement) was a key driver for 
their compliance with norms and rules. In many instances there may be a direct value fit 
or reconciliation between the participants' priority motivational values for acting and their 
compliance with a particular norm or rule within sustainable remediation. This was 
apparent for the Regulatory Authority and Local Government participant types, with their 
focus on ensuring compliance to protect the public interest (Rohan, 2000). In other 
instances, the fit between priority motivational values and compliance with norms and 
rules was not so direct (or, we  
could say, not so obvious). This was more common among participant types that were 
motivated by values within the domain of self- interest – power and achievement – such 
as the Auditor, Remediation Service Provider and Problem Holder (Rohan, 2000). In 
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these instances, the relationships between their motivational values of power and 
achievement (and their associated emotions) and compliance with norms and rules was 
through a delayed gratification. For example the Problem Holder's ability to maintain 
‘wealth’ in the longer term was the strongest motivator for compliance or rejection of 
norms.  
 
4.4. Limitations  
 
This study is of course subject to many of the limitations that beset institutional studies. 
Some of these limitations are obvious, for example the sample used in this study may 
have been biased due to the small sample size. Also, whilst in the theory behind the IGT 
the distinctions between norms and rules and their grammatical components are clear-cut, 
in practice the borders between various components are seldom as clear. This is because 
norms and rules are social phenomena (Searle, 2005). Like the grammar of everyday 
language, any grammar created for norms and rules is subject to misinterpretation and 
human error. Moreover, in an empirical situation the identification of grammar 
components or values is often beset with problems. For example, in the present study 
people were at first reluctant to reveal the motivational values that drove their decisions. 
Nevertheless, the researcher believes that the use of the IGT together with Schwartz's 
value system has helped to increase analytical rigour and the ability to articulate what is 
happening within sustainable remediation processes. The great achievement of the IGT is 
that it allows differentiation and classification of the components of norms and rules. 
Despite its limitations, the Schwartz value system provided insights into the association 
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between values and norms and rules. Such insights are rarely, if ever, available through 
other approaches.  
 
Limitations are not restricted to the study's methodology; our findings may also be 
limited by the study's scope and timeframe. Such limitations may only become apparent 
once further comparative studies have been conducted. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
study's findings are limited by its focus on Australian remediation processes. This is 
important to note given the paper's focus on values, which are often culturally dependent.  
 
4.5. Future research  
 
This study of the norms, rules and values driving sustainable remediation opens up 
several new perspectives on how such processes operate. The evidence from this study 
certainly supports the argument that we need to pay greater attention to understanding 
how norms, rules and values are incorporated into remediation. The evidence from our 
analysis provides compelling support for the development of pragmatic tools, studies and 
methods to encourage and enable participants within such processes to make explicit their 
diverse norms, rules and values, and the associations between them.  
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